Planning and Facilitating the Training of Emergency Medical Services on the Safe Transport of Patients with Highly Infectious Diseases by Alhallaf, Mohammed
University of Nebraska Medical Center 
DigitalCommons@UNMC 
Theses & Dissertations Graduate Studies 
Spring 5-9-2020 
Planning and Facilitating the Training of Emergency Medical 
Services on the Safe Transport of Patients with Highly Infectious 
Diseases 
Mohammed Alhallaf 
University of Nebraska Medical Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unmc.edu/etd 
 Part of the Infectious Disease Commons, Interprofessional Education Commons, Occupational Health 
and Industrial Hygiene Commons, Patient Safety Commons, and the Public Health Education and 
Promotion Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alhallaf, Mohammed, "Planning and Facilitating the Training of Emergency Medical Services on the Safe 
Transport of Patients with Highly Infectious Diseases" (2020). Theses & Dissertations. 437. 
https://digitalcommons.unmc.edu/etd/437 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@UNMC. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNMC. 
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@unmc.edu. 
Planning and Facilitating the Training of Emergency Medical 
Services on the Safe Transport of Patients with Highly Infectious 
Diseases 
By 
Mohammed A. Alhallaf 
 
A THESIS 
Presented to the Faculty of  
The University of Nebraska Graduate College 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirments  





Under the Supervision of Professor Sharon J. Medcalf 
 






Sharon J. Medcalf, Ph.D. John-Martin Lowe, Ph.D.  Theodore Cieslak, M.D.  
 i 
Acknowledgments  
First and foremost, I would like to thank the EMS-TSQC planning team at UNMC and 
the National Strategic Research Institute for inviting me to be involved in such a 
critical project. The amount of dedication and hard work you all put into making this 
project possible is greatly appreciated. You serve your EMS community selflessly 
and with pride, and that is to be commended.  
I owe an immense amount of thanks to my supervisory committee. To Dr. Sharon 
Medcalf, I owe you so much. You have guided me through the past two years, and I 
will always consider you a mentor and a friend. Thank you for not only your 
mentorship but also the friendship you gave to my family. To the rest of the 
committee, Dr. John Lowe and Dr. Ted Cieslak, without you, my journey would have 
stalled before it even started. Thank you! 
I want to write a special thanks to Ben Tysor at Omaha Fire Department and Morgan 
Shradar at Nebraska Medicine. You were always there to support me and answer my 
questions. You made the time to give me advice that will guide me forever.  
To my mother and father, I can only write thank you and I love you dearly. Last, I 
want to write how lucky I am to have the support of my loving wife, Maha. You 
encouraged me to pursue my dreams. The degree awarded me belongs as much to 
you. To my daughter Haya and son Omar, you have given my life a new meaning. 
This, and all that I do is for you.   
 ii 
Planning and Facilitating the Training of Emergency Medical Services on the 
Safe Transport of Patients with Highly Infectious Diseases 
Mohammed A. Alhallaf, M.S. 
University of Nebraska, 2020 
Advisor: Sharon J. Medcalf, Ph.D. 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel are the first line of treatment and are 
the first exposed health care workers to infectious diseases (IDs). Consequently, the 
EMS setting is a relatively vulnerable environment for disease transmission and 
cross-contamination. Also, serious and emerging IDs, such as highly pathogenic viral 
hemorrhagic fevers and novel Coronaviruses, in a time of increased globalization, 
require comprehensive EMS training and preparedness. This project had the 
objective of identifying best practices for the EMS transport of patients with IDs. The 
methods for this project were done in two phases. In the first stage, we conducted a 
literature review to outline current practices. In the second, we convened an EMS-ID 
Workgroup Meeting (held in Baltimore, MD, January 2020). The purpose of this 
meeting was to gather national and international experts to provide input to the 
University of Nebraska Medical Center to facilitate the development of an EMS-ID 
training curriculum. A total of 25 national and international EMS-ID organizations, 
along with CDC and ASPR officials, gathered to discuss best practices and work on 
answering common EMS-ID problematic areas. Topics were grouped into seven 
categories: equipment preparation, vehicle preparation, patient management, PPE 
selection, team configuration, decontamination, and post-mission surveillance. We 
report here the results of those discussions, highlighting the EMS Workgroup 
perspectives and noting areas where agreement could not be reached.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel are the first line of treatment 
and are the first exposed health care workers to infectious diseases (IDs). 
Consequently, the EMS setting is a relatively vulnerable environment for disease 
transmission and cross-contamination, keeping in mind that EMS providers may not 
have the sufficient training and knowledge for managing infectious patients and 
their transport. After the 2014-2016 Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in West 
Africa, and the first transmission of EVD to health care workers in the United States, 
the EMS community understandably experienced anxiety about the appropriate 
education and training, as well as procedures to best handle patients with IDs 
(Isakov et al., 2015). In fact, due to the increase in frequency and transmission of IDs 
with high consequence, such as EVD, two counties in California, Sacramento and 
Contra Costa, have developed a specialized infectious disease response team called 
the Infectious Disease Ambulance Response Team (IDART), which is capable of 
managing and transporting patients with communicable/infectious diseases, much 
like a Hazardous Material Team (HAZMAT) would respond to a scene of a toxic spill 
(Murdock, 2014). 
 Serious and emerging IDs, such as highly pathogenic viral hemorrhagic fevers 
and novel Coronaviruses, in a time of increased globalization and travel, require 
comprehensive EMS training and preparedness for efficient infection control 
practices. In addition to treating the increasingly mobile populations, who 
potentially have a higher likelihood of contracting an infectious or emerging disease, 
 2 
EMS personnel must decontaminate/disinfect their work equipment and 
ambulances, increasing their exposure to infectious pathogens (Woodside, 2013).  
 The extended amount of time EMS workers spend while wearing their 
personal protective equipment (PPE), can lead to fatigue, psychological stress, and 
possibly tears and degradation of the PPE, which places providers at a greater risk 
for contamination (Le et al., 2018). Ambulance workers must also consider what 
resources they have, develop a contingency plan for isolation and/or quarantine, 
manage medical waste, decide how many medics will be in the patient 
compartment, choose who will provide medications, and coordinate with state 
officials before transporting ID patients (CDC, Guidance for Developing a Plan for 
Interfacility Transport of Persons with EVD, 2017). To effectively answer these 
questions, a demanding amount of training and preparation must be done together 
with an intensive program of practice in the four infection control domains: hand 
hygiene, PPE selection and use, safe injections, and point of care testing prior to the 
decision to transport communicable/infectious disease patients.  
 The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
collaborated with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to 
conduct a study to explore the rates of EMS injuries and illnesses. Unfortunately, the 
study showed that EMS providers have higher rates of fatalities and work-related 
injuries than the general workforce, and that approximately 6,000 paramedics and 
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) are annually exposed to harmful 
substances, such as blood and respiratory secretions (Reichard, Marsh, Tonozzi, 
Konda, & Gormley, 2017). The study concluded that new and enhanced efforts are 
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needed to prevent the exposure of EMS personnel to harmful substances. 
Additionally, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) listed “treating 
patients with infectious illnesses” as one of the major job hazards EMS workers face 
as part of their duties (CDC, EMS Workers, 2018).  
 These exposures not only put paramedics and EMTs at serious risk for 
infections, but the general public as well; due to cross-contamination. Therefore, to 
enhance EMS workforce safety, and to protect the public’s health, it is important to 
develop, plan, identify, and facilitate the components and competencies for a 
comprehensive EMS infectious disease training program. A well-defined training 
program can also enhance the existing infection control practices performed by EMS 
providers. For example, one study found that medics’ hands were the primary 
vehicle of microbial transfer during actual EMS 911 calls, and that current practices 
of decontamination minimally reduced quantity and prevalence of viral loads, 
suggesting that the use of H2O2 wipes significantly reduced the concentration of 
viruses on EMS surfaces (Valdes, Sexton, Lutz, & Reynolds, 2015). Such 
recommendations can benefit the EMS community in implementing new and 
effective strategies of infection control and equipment decontamination. 
 To prepare professionals, the competency based training approach has 
attracted the interest of many educators around the world and became dominant in 
many medical and non-medical fields over the last four decades (Frank, 2010). The 
concept of competency based practice originated from paraller movements in 
professional training in a number of countries, such as the National Training Board 
in Australia, the National Skills Standards in the United States, and the National 
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Vocational Qualifications in England (Leung, 2002). If appropriately applied, 
competency frameworks can address the gap between the theory of competency 
based education and the practice of clinical teaching (Cate & Scheele, 2007).   
 
Statement of the Problem/Context 
 Infection control and prevention practices of EMS providers are ongoing 
issues (Jackson, Lowton, & Griffiths, 2014). Yet despite efforts and strategies to 
reduce the burden of IDs, EMS workers’ practice in dealing with communicable 
diseases is still reported as suboptimal due to poor knowledge of fundamental 
principles of infection control and disease transmission, as well as decreased 
compliance with standard precautions and equipment disinfection 
recommendations (Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017; Bledsoe et al., 2014; Harris & 
Nicolai, 2010; Shaban, 2006; Shaban, Creedy, & Clark, 2003).  
 An infection control training module, specific to EMS, needs to be developed 
together with a competency set for IDs and infection control procedures for the EMS 
community in the prehospital field (Lowe et al., 2015; Mahomed, Jinabhai, Taylor, & 
Yancey, 2007). Strengthening EMS training and education on Highly Infectious 
Diseases (HIDs) could improve patient outcomes, responders’ safety, and the 





Significance of Study/Project 
 To our knowledge, no study has yet developed a training set specific to the 
EMS community for transporting HID patients. The purpose of this project is to 
describe the process of identifying the need for an EMS-HID transport training 
program and to gather best practices on procedures for the EMS transport of 
patients with HID. 
 The results of this project will be valuable to: practitioners in the field of 
EMS, public health agencies, hospitals, and training facilities in developing better 
practices and tools for EMS-HID training programs. The outcomes of this work 
can enhance the occupational safety of EMS personnel by minimizing their 
exposure to infectious agents through a well-defined EMS-HID training set; 
improve patient outcomes; and eventually improve the community’s health.  
 
Research Question  
 This project investigates the components of an EMS-HID training program 
that can increase the knowledge and practice of paramedics and EMTs who may 
respond to patients with highly communicable/infectious illnesses. The overall 
objective of the project is to gather current practices, identify best practices, and 







1. The overall objective for this project is to gather best practices on procedures 
for the transport of patients with HID.  
2. Identify areas of consensus and gaps in EMS-HID practice.   
3. Develop broad program educational skills to train prehospital providers who 
may potentially transport a HID patient. 
 To achieve the overall aim, the author will be providing a comprehensive 
review of sources related to HID training for EMS providers. And specify best 
practices, from national and international EMS-HID experts, in regards to 
transporting patients with communicable/infectious diseases.  
 
Definitions of Terms 
The term being defined is in Bold: 
1. Competency: The knowledge, skills, and abilities demonstrated by 
organization or system members needed to perform specific functions within 
organizations or professional practice (Birkhead, Davies, Miner, Lemmings & 
Koo, 2008). 
2. Emergency Medical Services (EMS): The NHTSA’s Office of EMS defines 
EMS as a system that provides emergency medical care. Once it is activated 
by an incident that causes serious illness or injury, the focus of EMS is 
emergency medical care of the patient(s) (2019). 
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3. Emergency Medical Technician (EMT): Stanford Medicine, EMT Program 
defines EMT as an emergency responder trained to provide medical care. 
“EMTs may be solely responsible for the treatment and transportation of 
their patients or assist a paramedic, nurse, physician or other advanced life 
support provider” (2019).  
4. Infectious Disease (ID): According to the World Health Organization 
(WHO), infectious diseases are caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such 
as bacteria, viruses, parasites, or fungi. The diseases can spread directly or 
indirectly from one person to another (2019). In this document, HIDs refer to 
highly hazardous communicable disease, high consequence infectious 
diseases, and/or high consequence communicable diseases. 
5. Paramedic: The Department of Labor defines a paramedic as a person who 
responds to emergency calls, performing medical services, and transporting 
patients to medical facilities (2019). 
6. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): According to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), PPE include equipment for eyes, 
face, head, extremities, respiratory devices, and protective shields; 
depending on the nature of the incident (2019). 
7. Standard precautions: Standard precautions are disease transmission 
prevention strategies recommended by both the CDC & WHO, and are 





1. The EMS workgroup participating organizations are willing to engage and 
share their experiences that are related to the training of EMS and the safe 
transport of HID patients. 
2. The participating organizations have experienced, or will experience, 
training EMS on transporting patients with highly communicable/infectious 
illnesses. 
3. The EMS Workgroup participants are willing to share resources, such as data, 
recommendations, past experiences, that are beneficial to training EMS 
providers on handling and transporting HID patients. 














CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: 
This section will be divided into: literature of EMS transport of HIDs and literature 
of educational competency development. 
 1. Literature of EMS Transport of Patients with HIDs:  
 Prehospital personnel may be exposed to infections and body fluids of their 
patients due to the unpredictable nature of their job and the uncontrolled 
environment, as it is not always possible to predict which patient has a 
communicable disease (Speers, 2014). In fact, the effects of the stressful nature of 
EMS work has led to paramedicine being among the most dangerous careers 
(Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017). However, to minimize the risk of 
contamination, standard precautions and PPE  must be practiced, and PPE worn, at 
all times, together with appropriate immunization, continued education, and post 
exposure counselling of EMS staff (Speers, 2014).  
 Prehospital providers experience significant exposure to blood and body 
fluids, but at the same time, EMS workers are not consistently utilizing standard 
precautions and equipment disinfection recommendations, which is due to poor 
knowledge of fundamental principles of infection control and disease transmission 
(Thomas, O’Meara, & Spelten, 2017; Bledsoe et al., 2014; Harris & Nicolai, 2010; 
Shaban, 2006; Shaban, Creedy, & Clark, 2003); including failure to wear gloves 
(17%) and the inappropriate disposal of contaminated materials (79%) (Harris & 
Nicolai, 2010).   
 Despite these shortcomings, two studies reported the exposure rates to IDs 
in the U.S. among paramedics who work in a similar ambulance service company. 
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Both showed a decrease from 4.4 exposures per 1,000 EMS calls to 1.2 exposures 
per 1,000 EMS calls between 1993 and 2011, which is attributed to continued 
education and training on the appropriate use of PPE and infection control 
measures (Sayed, Kue, McNeil, & Dyer, 2011; Reed, Daya, Jui, Grellman, & Loveless, 
1993).  
 During the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 
Canada, 68 paramedics developed SARS, and 292 medics were placed on either 
home quarantine or work quarantine, which was due to the medics’ unprotected 
exposure (not wearing the appropriate PPE) to health care facilities that 
experienced a SARS outbreak (Verbeek, McClelland, Silverman, & Burgess, 2004). 
Those who developed SARS did not use appropriate PPE, and four out of five 
paramedics initiated patient contact before being directed to wear their PPE 
(Verbeek et al., 2004).  
 Another study examined paramedics’ exposure to various infectious disease 
hazards and found that they were most commonly exposed to meningitis (32.9%), 
followed by tuberculosis, viral respiratory infections, and body fluid splashes to skin 
and eyes; suggesting the use of protective eyewear to minimize the risk of body fluid 
splashes (Sayed, Kue, McNeil, & Dyer, 2011).  
 A qualitative study assessed the retention of donning and doffing of Level C 
(chemical-resistant coverall, butyl gloves, boots, and an air-purifying respirator) 
PPE skills among paramedics who received Level C PPE training six months ago at 
the University of Pittsburg. The study found that only 14.3% of medics successfully 
donned and doffed (suggesting that the current training is inadequate) without 
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committing a critical error, such as early removal of the respirator, with the most 
common non-critical error involving the removal of boots before other parts of the 
PPE ensemble (Northington, Mahoney, Hahn, Suyama, & Hostler, 2007). This study 
used a standardized training module and checklist adopted from a disaster medicine 
course taught at the University of Pittsburg as an evaluation tool for the paramedic’s 
performance.  
 A survey by Visentin et al., assessed the use of PPE among EMS personnel 
during ID outbreak and non-outbreak situations, and found that the most common 
reasons for inconsistent donning of PPE were: judgment of non-necessity by the 
medics, and technical difficulties wearing the PPE (e.g., visual impairment while 
wearing protective eyewear) (2009). Another survey conducted on the EMS 
personnel in Summit County, Ohio indicated that medics need continued education 
focusing on the routes of transmission of IDs, their risk of contamination, and the 
effective use of protective gear. These results were due to the medics’ lack of 
knowledge of diseases’ routes of transmission, and the non-compliance with 
standard precautions (Mencl, Birkle, Blanda, & Gerson, 2000).  
 A most recent qualitative study examining EMS providers perspectives at one 
of the designated U.S. Ebola Centers showed that current EMS-ID training sessions 
were mostly focused on PPE, but neglected the basic knowledge of HID 
transmission, resulting in lack of confidence and feeling of danger among EMS 
practitioners during actual responses (Alexander, Masters, & Warren, 2020). The 
study concluded by stating that some of these concerns may be mitigated by 
providing continuous pandemic preparedness and training to EMS personnel. 
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 A gap analysis survey of EMS practitioners’ assessment of needs when 
transporting patients with HIDs highlighted the lack of consistent guidelines and 
training for prehospital personnel, and that EMS workers have limited time in their 
national curricula devoted to the identification of IDs and infection control practices 
(Le et al., 2018). At the end of this survey, respondents were asked to provide 
opinions. These included the need for a more quality training of IDs and not feeling 
confident enough to respond to HID patients.  
 Lowe et al., (2015) identified several considerations for the safe EMS 
transport of patients infected with EVD. Based on their analysis, they recommend: 
ambulance preparation (including stripping the ambulance patient care cabin of all 
equipment that is not required for transport, draping the patient compartment with 
6-mm plastic sheeting secured with duct tape, and isolating the driver’s 
compartment from the patient’s), appropriate selection of PPE, and post 
transport/environmental decontamination.  
 Isakov et al., (2015) identified collaboration between EMS and the receiving 
hospitals as one component to fill educational and training gaps related to 
transporting patients with EVD, as well as teaching medics how to prepare the 
ambulance in advance to facilitate cleaning and decontamination. Isakov et al., 
(2015) also recommended that the ventilation system in the driver’s compartment 
to be turned on with the fan set to high, without recirculation, to create a positive 
pressure area and to prevent from aerosols entering the compartment. They also 
noted that the Tyvek suit and hooded, powered, air-purifying respirator provided 
suitable splash protection, prevented medics from incautious touching of the face, 
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and did not cause eyewear fogging. As to ambulance waste after the transport of an 
ID patient, EMS staff PPE and any other waste from the ambulances transporting 
EVD patients at the Nebraska Biocontainment Unit (NBU) were bagged, secured, and 
passed to health care workers at the NBU to be placed in an autoclave (Lowe et al., 
2015). 
 The United States Fire Administration listed the components of an infection 
control training program, which included: epidemiology, proper use of PPE, 
standard operating procedures for safe work practices, proper disposal of medical 
waste, cleaning and decontamination, exposure management, and vehicle/supply 
preparation (Guide to Managing an Emergency Service Infection Control Program, 
2002).  
 Additionally, the Washington State Department of Health’s Manual, Infectious 
Disease Prevention for EMS Providers, gives a detailed explanation on the proper 
techniques of managing an ID patient in the field (2009). The CDC, together with the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), also created guidance 
for developing a plan for interfacility transport of persons under investigation or 
confirmed patients with EVD in the United States (2017). 
 Another study demonstrated the spread of microbes during actual EMS calls. 
The study found that medics’ hands were the primary vehicle of microbial transfer 
(Valdes, Sexton, Lutz, & Reynolds, 2015). The study also found that current practices 
of decontamination minimally reduced quantity and prevalence of viral loads, 
suggesting that the use of H2O2 wipes significantly reduced the concentration of 
viruses on EMS surfaces, and that additional training on decontamination and hand 
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hygiene must be provided to the EMS personnel. The Pennsylvania Department of 
Health (DOH) recently recommended that ambulances be taken out of service for at 
least two hours after transporting measles patients - because measles virus can 
contaminate surfaces or hang in the air for up to two hours (DOH, 2019).  
 One observational study highlighted the use of standard precautions by EMS 
providers arriving at a large emergency department (ER). The study indicated the 
following: only 56.9% of medics arrived wearing gloves; hand washing was 
observed in only 27.8% of providers; equipment disinfection was noted in 31.6%, 
with the most commonly disinfected item being the patient stretcher (Bledsoe et al., 
2014). Another observational study examined EMS personnel commitment to the 
four infection control domains: hand hygiene, PPE selection and use, safe injections, 
and point of care testing. The study found that only 50% of the EMS providers 
performed hand hygiene (County of Los Angeles Public Health, Communicable 
Disease Control, 2016). 
 The risk of communicable disease is not as obvious as other physical risks to 
the EMS personnel, such as road traffic and power line accidents, and therefore, EMS 
providers must receive a training that enables them to identify at-risk patients and 
the appropriate level of PPE (MacDonald, 2014). The risk assessment begins with 
screening questions and information obtained from the dispatch communication 
center, prior to making patient contact (MacDonald, 2014). These screening 
questions can include asking the caller for their present symptoms or if there is 
anyone else who is also sick at the callers’ location (EMS Infectious Disease 
Playbook, 2017).  
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 In some parts of Europe, there are specifically designed ambulances for the 
transport of patients with infectious diseases and are operated by the Hazardous 
Area Response Team (HART) paramedics (Schilling et al., 2013). The specific 
technical features on board these vehicles include controlled ventilation, negative 
pressure, HEPA filtration, aerosol tight systems, fixed equipment and walls that can 
be easily disinfected, and separation of driver’s from patient’s cabin (Schilling et al., 
2013).  
To conclude this section:  
 A preliminary literature review shows that past studies are primarily focused 
on the weaknesses of EMS management of patients with HIDs. What is missing from 
the past studies is a comprehensive and structured approach for developing 
competencies to train EMS providers on the safe transport of patients with IDs. 
Specifically, prehospital personnel need a training module that focuses on: 
identifying at-risk patients before making patient contact, compliance with standard 
precautions, modes of transmission of IDs, appropriate selection of PPE, donning 
and doffing procedures, ambulance preparation, decontamination of the vehicle and 
its equipment, and medical waste management. 
 
2. Literature on Educational Competency Development 
 There are eight competency areas included in the Core Competencies for 
public health professionals developed by the Public Health Foundation (PHF) and 
Council on Linkages between Academia and Public Health Practice (COL), which 
apply to all public health specialists including paramedics (Birkhead, Davies, Miner, 
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Lemmings & Koo, 2008). The competency domains of public health practice are: 
analytic/assessment, policy development and program planning, communication, 
cultural competency, community dimensions of practice, public health sciences, 
financial planning and management, and leadership and systems thinking, with each 
domain having at least one primary competency statement (PHF, 2014). The 
competencies can serve to define knowledge gaps that can lead to the development 
of a specific training plan (Birkhead, Davies, Miner, Lemmings & Koo, 2008). The 
COL’s competencies have served as a framework to build public health-relevant 
competency sets, such as public health preparedness and applied epidemiology 
(Koo & Miner, 2010).   
 Koo & Miner (2010) recommended a framework for workforce education in 
public health by targeting three conceptual approaches: adult learning theory, 
competency-based education, and the Dreyfus model in public health. Adult learning 
theory includes letting the adult learner know why they are learning, what the goal 
is, and whether they can achieve it, and is useful in preparation of the learning 
environment and engaging the learner in the appropriate types of learning 
activities. The theory of competency-based education as explained by Koo & Miner 
(2010) is based on the eight competency domains of the PHF, COL. The Dreyfus 
model in public health provides key guidance for selecting the suitable skill level for 
the different learners and focuses on longer-term career outcomes (Koo & Miner, 
2010). The integration of the three concepts can produce high-quality workforce 
education.  
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 The National Center for Environmental Health, within the CDC, has published 
recommendations for local environmental health practitioners; these include 14 
core competencies grouped into three primary functions: assessment, management, 
and communication (2001). Assessment involves conducting a literature search and 
consulting with experts in the field. Management involves clearly articulating a 
problem and taking appropriate measures to resolve it. Communication involves 
effectively identifying “teaching moments” and emphasizing prevention (National 
Center for Environmental Health, CDC, 2001).  
 The Association for Professionals in Infection Control (APIC) and 
Epidemiology developed a conceptual model of Infection Prevention (IP) 
Competency that could be applicable in all practice settings (Murphy et al., 2012). 
The four domains identified by APIC represent a future-oriented competency 
development: leadership, infection prevention and control, technology, and 
performance improvement, which are described in detail in this reference (Murphy 
et al., 2012). The Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology (CBIC) 
has also identified core competencies for IP, which included the identification of ID 
processes, controlling the transmission of infectious agents, and education and 
research (2012). The Journal of Infection Prevention has also published 17 
competencies to design a well-structured education and training program specific to 
IP, which includes: clinical practice, education, research, and leadership and 




CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION METHODS: 
 The methods for this project were done in two phases. In the first stage we 
conducted a literature review to outline current practices. In the second stage, we 
convened an EMS-ID Workgroup Meeting that included national experts from ASPR, 
NDMS, and CDC, as well as international HID experts, with an overall objective of 
identifying best practices. Finally, inputs and comments were collected using the 
Sphere Software. 
 The overall objective of the literature search was to identify 
agreement/disagreement areas between what is available from the literature and 
was discussed in the EMS-ID Workgroup Meeting. We reviewed the EMS ID 
literature available on Google Scholar and PubMed online databases using the 
search queries: EMS, paramedic, EMT, prehospital, MEDEVAC, ambulance, 
prevention, PPE, infectious disease, communicable disease, contagious, outbreak, 
containment of biohazards, and infection control, limited to the English language. 
These queries yielded 18 unique citations, which were imported into an electronic 
database (RefWorks).  
 Additionally, manually reviewed citations from related articles generated 
seven more sources. We included original, peer-reviewed articles evaluating EMS 
capability, weaknesses, and recommendations for the transport of patients with IDs. 
Articles were excluded if the sample population did not include paramedics, EMTs, 
or prehospital physicians and/or nurses, which required full-text review.  
 In the second stage of this project, we convened an EMS-ID Workgroup 
Meeting (held in Baltimore, MD, January 2020). The purpose of this meeting was to 
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gather national and international experts to provide input to the University of 
Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC) to facilitate the development of an EMS-ID 
training curriculum. A total of 25 national and international EMS-ID organizations, 
along with CDC and ASPR officials, gathered to discuss best practices and work on 
answering common EMS-HID problematic areas. The meeting was organized by 
UNMC and the National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI). No attempt was made to 
identify the credentials of the attendees nor their professional backgrounds. This 
strategy was used to ensure that each member was equally represented and to 
promote open discussion among all participants. Discussion was open to achieve an 
overall objective of sharing knowledge and identifying consensus around the 
following pre-identified content areas: 
Content Areas: 
1- Special equipment preparation 
2- Vehicle preparation for ground transportation 
3- Patient management 
4- Infection Prevention and Control (IPC) practice, including PPE-related 
processes 
5- Team configuration and communication 
6- Hygiene, decontamination, and waste management 




 Finally, we solicited inputs and comments from practicing ID experts and 25 
national and international organizations representing EMS using the Sphere 
Software. It is a platform designed for this type of collaboration meetings where 
data can be gathered simultaneously from multiple parties without disrupting the 
process. Participants were able to type their thoughts and questions without 
interrupting the presenter. The presenter (or any of the attendees) can then answer 
the questions and respond to the typed comments. Participants were introduced to 
the system before the start of the workshop.  
 Verbal comments and questions (that were not typed) were entered into the 
system by two notetakers. Here, we present the results of those discussions, 
highlighting the EMS Workgroup perspectives and noting areas where agreement 
could not be reached, followed by a summary of what should be incorporated into 
an EMS-ID training program (‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training 
Curriculum”). 
Sample Population:  
 The primary research method for this project is literature review and 
conceptual modeling. One EMS-HID expert workshop in Baltimore, MD will be 
assembled to identify current and best practices to transport patients with HIDs. 
The workshop participants (the EMS Workgroup) are national and international 
experts in the field of EMS and IDs. Inputs and comments will be solicited from 
participating organizations representing EMS and the transport of HID patients. The 
number of participating organizations is approximately 25 agencies from Korea, 
Japan, Singapore, Germany, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom, as well as 
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representatives from the CDC, ASPR, John Hopkins, NIH, Emory University, Indiana 
University, UNMC, and Omaha Fire Department.   
Timelines: 
Date Task 
October 10th  Final proposal submission  
October 21st  Schedualing comprehensive exam on Seguidor  
Week of October 
21st  
Start writing the first section of the Thesis 
January of 2020) Collecting data from the EMS-HID Workgroup participants 
together with conducting a literature/resource search to 
gather and determine best EMS-HID practices  
January-March Completing all sections of the thesis project 
Finish the reference page 
Proofread, refine, edit, before submission 
March 20th  Submission of the final paper to Dr. Sharon Medcalf 
April 6th  Submission of the paper to the Thesis committee  
April 15th  Final Thesis presentation 
 
Data Analysis:  
 The author analyzed data generated internally using simple statistics (e.g., 
percentages, averages, and frequency). Also, because the project’s data is mainly 
composed of current observations, knowledge, recommendations, there was no 
need for complex numerical data analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Content Area #1: Special Equipment Preparation: 
 As noted earlier, patient movement and biocontainment are among the most 
challenging tasks prehospital providers encounter when transporting patients with 
HIDs. It is crucial for EMS providers to plan and exercise the types of patient 
isolation systems used to transport special patients. The two isolation transport 
units discussed as measures to implement infection control were the ISOPOD and 
the EpiShuttle (developed after the 2014 EVD outbreak). Both units share the same 
indications of use - to contain the pathogens and decrease the risk of cross-
contamination. 
 In this section of the workshop, we discussed the similarities and differences 
between the two isolators. Both Patient Isolation Units (PIUs) provide a negative 
pressure environment but require training prior to usage. The two PIUs provide 
access to the patient through the incorporated access ports (e.g., glove ports and 
ventilation ports), and thus, both are vulnerable to damage and, possibly, leakage of 
fluids. Also, fogging and decreased visibility through the transparent surface of the 
EpiShuttle was a special issue noted by the workgroup. Nevertheless, few 
participants encouraged the idea of using anti-fog products to enhance visibility. 
Our working group highlighted one major difference between the two PIUs - the 
adjustable internal stretcher of the EpiShuttle - which could improve patient 
experience and comfort during transport.  
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The EpiShuttle was also noted to have protective outer layers, allowing the 
unit to be re-used for up to five years or 20 uses (whichever comes first). 
Additionally, the EpiShuttle was acknowledged because it allowed for a reduction in 
the level of PPE required to implement IPC (since the patient is fully encapsulated), 
and therefore, lowered the risk of generated hazardous waste and offered an 
opportunity for a longer duration of travel (without change of caregivers).  
A significant limitation of the EpiShuttle was the size configuration. 
Larger/taller patients would not fit into the unit, and thus, the EpiShuttle was not 
seen by the workgroup as practical as the ISOPOD. It also required individual 
adapters to be secured to the ambulance stretcher, which may not always be 
available for rapid deployment. Because there were many differences between the 
two, using an ISOPOD versus the Epishuttle was one area where participants could 
not reach an agreement. However, we all stressed the need for EMS agencies to 
clearly define when/when not to use a PIU in their protocols and Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs). If there is a risk for exposure to bodily fluids, the 
workgroup recommended using a PIU. But if the patient is “dry” or “stable”, he/she 
may not need to be placed in a PIU.  
Many of our working group emphasized the importance of pre-positioning 
several patient care items inside the PIU for potential use during transport. These 
items included emesis bags; a marker board to ease communication or disposable 
walkie-talkies utilized for patient communication; ventilation devices; and a 
dedicated intravenous medication line to push medications as needed (e.g., 
sedatives, antiemetics, etc.). Further discussion on patient management techniques 
 24 
will be outlined in the next sections. In addition to the ambulance’s medical 
equipment, it was acknowledged that having additional hazardous waste bags, leak-
proof containers, and impermeable sheets inside the patient care area may be useful 
for unstable patients who may produce excessive bodily fluids.  
In addition to using a Bluetooth earpiece with a push-to-talk button or 
hands-free radios, a few of the group members proposed the idea of providing 
cooling vests for the EMS crew to provide comfort while performing patient 
transport in full PPE. Lastly, wearing external rubber boots was recognized by the 
















Content Area #2: Vehicle Preparation for Ground 
Transportation: 
 The discussion started by acknowledging that, in case the patient’s condition 
deteriorates (i.e., loss of consciousness) diversion from the receiving facility is not 
an option because the receiving hospital is prepared for the patient, whereas any 
other receiving facility may not be prepared with high level infection prevention 
mitigation processes or environments. Therefore, the transport unit must be 
sufficiently equipped and ready to provide safe, acute patient care (i.e., ventilatory 
support, cardiac monitoring, and medication infusion) until reaching its final 
destination.  
 The participants concurred with Lowe et al (2014) that the patient cabin 
should be draped with 6-mm plastic sheeting cut in  a “U” shape and secured with 
Gorilla or duct tape. The process of draping an ambulance takes approximately one 
hour for two experienced personnel, and therefore, early notification should be 
practiced. Our working group also encouraged the use of the commercially available 
6-mm plastic tarp designed for ambulance protection, which minimizes installation 
time to approximately 20 minutes.  
 While others still draped the back of the ambulance when using a PIU, many 
of the workgroup participants felt that draping the back of the ambulance when 
using a PIU is not necessary. The idea behind draping the patient compartment 
when using a PIU is to guard against unrecognized external contamination of the 
PIU. Nevertheless, the considerable majority agreed that the team who installed the 
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tarp/plastic draping should be the same team to remove and decontaminate the 
draping. That is because the installation team knows where the seams and tabs on 
tape and tarp/plastic draping are, thus minimizing the risk of potential 
unrecognized hazards.  
As to the environmental modifications and HVAC control, the workgroup 
perspectives concurred with previous studies that the patient cabin must be 
isolated from the driver compartment; vent system in the driver compartment 
should be set to high without recirculation; and exhaust fan in the patient cabin is 
set to high (Kumar & Isakov, 2018). It was also acknowledged that lowering the 
cabin temperature for febrile patients may be helpful.  
The participants discussed safety considerations for draping a standard 
ambulance and noted that including the following safety features may be necessary 
for future transports: seatbelt access; positive pressure air vents uncovered; 
painter’s drop cloth or impermeable sheets to minimize slip hazard; and 
communication devices with external personnel. Using impermeable/impervious 
drapes over plastic was noted to be not as slippery as plastic and provided extra 
traction for the caregivers when wearing external rubber boots. Also, 
impermeable/impervious drapes did not require scissors or sharps when removed 
from the back of the ambulance and was semi-absorbent for patients experiencing  
diarrhea or vomiting. It is advised that applying these environmental modifications 
be supervised and conducted with the presence of a safety officer.  
Some of our working group participants agreed that all medical equipment 
(e.g., cardiac monitor and suction unit) should be inside the patient cabin and 
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accessible but not exposed to contamination. Others felt for the need to remove all 
unessential equipment to a secondary transport/chase vehicle. Some participants 
felt that having pre-drawn medications secured/taped to the inside wall of the 
patient cabin may be helpful and can ease treatment procedures during transport 
(e.g., nausea), but the majority preferred to pre-treat patients before transport. 
Many of our international participants did not express interest in conducting 
the above mentioned environmental modifications to a standard ambulance. 
Instead, they preferred using a dedicated Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
(CBRN) ambulance equipped with controlled ventilation; negative pressure; HEPA 
filtration; separated driver compartment; and intercommunication systems. 
Nonetheless, we all agreed that it is a preferred practice to arrange with nearby EMS 
agencies to stage additional ambulances as backup units, loaded with extra supplies 
and a PPE-capable team. A summary of additional special equipment considerations 











Content Area #3: Patient Management: 
This section highlights two goals: 1. Patient safety 2. Protection of EMS crew. 
The overall objective is to provide quality patient care while balancing the needs of 
the patient with the safety of the crew.  
 
1. Patient Preparation: 
Depending on the patient’s condition, status, and signs and symptoms, some 
of our working group advised putting the adult patient in PPE (surgical mask, gown, 
impervious suit/sheet, undergarment, etc.) while being transported in a PIU. This is 
especially useful in the back of the ambulance, where close quarters cannot be 
avoided. The thought behind putting the patient in PPE inside a PIU is to arrest the 
spread of pathogens. The participants explained that having the patient wear the 
appropriate PPE may be useful in the event of a breach; needing to access the 
patient in PIU during transport; or in case of a PIU failure (e.g., HEPA blower failure 
requiring the need to open PIU). We advocate that EMS agencies anticipating the 
transport of patients with IDs to have written protocols addressing the issue of 
opening a PIU during transport.  
The workgroup further discussed whether patients should wear N95 
respirators or surgical masks. They concurred with Balazy and colleagues that 
surgical masks are adequate and that they are primarily designed to protect the 
environment from the wearer, whereas N95 respirators are intended to protect the 
wearer from the environment (2006). Nevertheless, we encourage establishing 
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early communication with the sending facility regarding patient preparation 
procedures. 
The workgroup recommended that the team who packages the patient inside 
the portable isolator (using a verified packaging checklist) should not be the one to 
clean the outer surface of the PIU - to mitigate the threat of unrecognized 
contamination on the outside of the PIU. Although this practice may not be possible 
in the EMS setting and will require more personnel in PPE, every exposed EMS 
provider should be monitored following patient contact. If there is a limited number 
of providers, a change of gloves between packaging and cleaning must be done.  
Finally, our working group highlighted the importance of not allowing passengers, 
family members, or personal belongings in the sterilized driver compartment to 
prevent potential hazards or possible cross-contamination.   
 
 2. Treatment Considerations: 
 This section depends on whether the transport team is a Basic Life Support, 
Advanced Life Support, or a Critical Care Transport crew. Nevertheless, the 
workgroup reasoned that managing HID patients without understanding the 
epidemiology of the disease may produce fear and anxiety. In fact, understanding 
the nature of the illness helps Healthcare Workers (HCWs) recognize how to 
interrupt transmission, prevent cross-contamination, and decrease hesitancy and 
reluctance when caring for highly hazardous patients (Alexander, Masters, & 
Warren, 2020). 
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 Pre-determining all patient care interventions was acknowledged to be a 
critical factor in achieving successful transport. Many of our participants 
encouraged the following: limiting the number of exposed providers; pre-treating 
for symptoms; limiting sharps; and limiting aerosol producing procedures (e.g., 
airway suctioning). Airway management and invasive procedures should be done 
before transport. We acknowledged that, if using a PIU, EMS providers could 
consider using blind airway insertion devices, such as King airway, rather than 
intubation. It is also best if diarrhea and vomiting can be controlled with 
pharmaceuticals prior to transport. When anticipating longer transport tasks, the 
working group noted the need to coordinate with the sending facility to place a 
Foley catheter to drain urine, especially when providing fluid therapy, as this is 
normally outside of EMS scope of practice. 
In the case of clinical deterioration resulting in death during transport, the 
workgroup noted that prolonged Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR) might not 
be possible. If so, the EMS crew will need to rapidly identify reversible causes of 
arrest and obtain more respondents in full PPE. The presence of additional 
providers in this confined setting may lead to infection control breaches and an 
increased risk of cross-contamination. For all of these reasons, and to protect the 
safety of the providers, the working group did not encourage CPR while en route to 
a receiving facility. However, this is highly dependent on the patient’s condition, 
presenting symptoms, types of PPE, and length of transport time. Such intensive 
clinical care protocols (CPR, intubation, etc.) should involve the ethics principle and 
be planned with ID experts (Komar & Isakov, 2018).   
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3. Patient Hand-Off (Transfer of Care): 
There was agreement that receiving hospitals should plan a secure 
(preferably indoor, climate-controlled) ambulance bay. It is best if the transfer of 
care site is spacious to permit multiple vehicles access, with clear separation of 
clean and dirty zones, to allow for ambulance decontamination and PPE doffing 
(discussed in the next sections). The site should also be equipped with bathroom 
facilities and running water.  
The medic unit driver, or a member of the receiving facility, will open the 
back door and help remove the patient from the ambulance, but stay at the foot of 
the stretcher. The workgroup reasoned that opening and closing doors should not 
be done by any of the EMS caregivers due to contamination risk. Afterward, the 
medic driver should take the ambulance to the pre-determined location for 
decontamination, where he/she will doff PPE with the assistance of a trained 
observer using a verified PPE doffing checklist.  
If paramedics help transfer the patient to the hospital bed, they will secure 
the stretcher and any used/exposed equipment for decontamination. Providers who 
assisted hospital staff with patient movement will perform PPE doffing inside the 
facility’s decontamination area. All patient personal items are handled as 
contaminated items until autoclaved or chemically decontaminated to be returned 
to the patient.  
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Content Area #4: PPE Selection and IPC Related Processes: 
The selection of the appropriate protective gear should be constructed based 
on a case-by-case analysis, transmission-based precautions (contact, droplet, 
aerosol), and in accordance with the CDC guidelines and recommendations. The 
workgroup noticed that the two goals when donning/doffing protective gear are the 
use of a proven checklist with the presence of a trained observer and frequent  
training of providers on competencies to use PPE ensembles. Many of our 
participants recommended that for caregivers, it may be necessary to wear 
impermeable gowns or coveralls; triple-layer gloves; boot covers; apron; full-face 
shield; and N95 respirators or Powered Air-Purifying Respirators (PAPR). A few of 
our international participants recommended using a fully encapsulating single piece 
suit with welded gloves and sock feet (Respirex FloPodTM Suit) with a two-way 
radio. The workgroup acknowledged the possibility of applying anti-fog products on 
face screens to enhance visibility. 
We recognized that if the driver compartment is isolated, it is a redundant 
precaution for the medic driver to wear a N95 respirator, but consistent with the 
CDC guidelines issued for the transport of patients with SARS (CDC, SARS Guidance 
for EMS, 2004) - keeping in mind that there may be unrecognized mixing of air 
between the patient’s and driver’s compartments in some ambulance designs.  
The participants also discussed the important of considering how long EMS 
providers are allowed in PPE while in the back of the ambulance. If prolonged 
transport is anticipated, there should be a designated, secured respite site where 
providers can switch roles and doff their PPE - planning with environmental 
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services and law enforcement is key. Also, when we discussed the respective 
maximum time limit in PPE, we agreed that it is subjected to personal tolerance; the 
level type of PPE; environmental conditions; physical fitness; work demand; and 
battery life of the blower unit. Most agreed that two to three hours is sufficient for 
providers to be in PPE, but no longer than safe and effective IPC practice 
(accommodating for patient loading and unloading times).   
Lastly, most of our group participants rely on safety officers to monitor staff 
in PPE and the overall performance (may not be possible unless a safety officer 
travels with the team). And we noted that aside from training HCWs, it may be 
necessary to train other personnel and non-medical crew on PPE donning and 














Content Area #5: Team Configuration and Communication: 
 It is expected that the transport operation will be supported by an incident 
command structure with a dedicated safety officer and a backup unit/secondary 
transport team carrying extra supplies. We agreed that best practice is to limit the 
number of exposed providers as reasonably possible. This, however, depends on the 
patient’s condition and needs. Our working group indicated that, when using a PIU, a 
member of the hospital/biocontainment staff can assist with the PIU processes and 
ride with the ambulance crew. As to roles and responsibilities, we acknowledged 
that the medic driver will not make any patient contact but will assist the crew with 
opening and closing doors. The driver will be isolated from the patient compartment 
and will be wearing a coverall, N95 respirator, and goggles without wearing hooded 
PAPR and hazmat boots as this might not be safe to operate a vehicle. Also, private 
Radio channels are preferred to prevent from interruptions and/or the available 
radio scanning applications. 
The number of providers inside the patient compartment varies based on 
several factors, including whether the patient is ambulatory or not, and whether 
he/she needs ventilatory support. Nonetheless, in addition to the medic driver, most 
agreed that having two paramedics in full PPE with communication devices installed 
inside the coverall (preferred disposable walkie-talkies) is sufficient. But if 
necessary, a specialty provider (e.g., peds/neo) can join the EMS team to provide 
further care. A supervisor and a safety officer - ready to be deployed in full PPE- are 
encouraged to travel with the crew to monitor the overall performance and IPC 
requirements. Additionally, in case of an emergency stop, the chase/secondary 
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vehicle may carry other supplies, such as water coolers, tables for equipment, and 
tent. Lastly, it may be required to coordinate with environmental services and law 
enforcement to establish secured respite sites where a change of crew (for 
prolonged transports) can occur.  
 
 
Content Area #6: Decontamination and Waste Handling: 
In this section, we first discussed the nature of the location in which the 
disinfection/decontamination will occur. We agreed that the transfer of care 
location within a hospital should be spacious to allow for multiple vehicles and to 
accommodate PPE doffing zones (with clear separation of clean and dirty areas). In 
this site, wipe down of vehicle, equipment, and the collection of biomedical waste 
will take place, keeping in mind that hazardous waste is highly regulated -
Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR, 49 C.F.R., Parts 171-180). Also, having an 
indoor location is preferred because it can offer protection against weather 
elements and secure from bystanders and media.  
We acknowledged that visibly soiled surfaces must first be decontaminated 
using an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) registered disinfectant following 
the directions on the label. Used/exposed medical equipment and high touch 
surfaces (e.g., door handles) must also be decontaminated. Generated waste, 
including clothes worn under PPE, should be packaged in autoclave bags and bins 
and transported for autoclave/disposal facility. Our working group did not 
recommend using disinfectant sprays because it is an aerosol producing procedure. 
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Once all tape/wire ties have been cut, plastic draping inside the patient 
compartment can be folded in on itself and disposed of as hazardous waste. Finally, 
depending on the size of the autoclave, the ISOPOD can be cut down and autoclaved 
at the receiving facility - keeping in mind that best practice may be to partner with 
the receiving hospital or a specialized company to handle the waste. 
After wiping down the entire ambulance with an EPA registered disinfectant, 
many of our working group suggested using vaporized hydrogen peroxide 
disinfection (Bioquell) for vehicle decontamination. And while others preferred 
applying Ultraviolet Germicidal Irradiation (UVGI) light, few recommended using 
gaseous Chlorine dioxide. Recent studies have shown that using UVGI in multiple 
locations can effectively reduce microbial contamination and mitigate 













Content Area #7: Post-Transportation Actions: 
We highlighted the importance of post-mission surveillance following the 
successful transport of HID patients. The workgroup noted that, in addition to being 
monitored for signs and symptoms of the disease for the incubation period and 
general wellbeing, it might be necessary to provide mental health resources to the 
EMS team following patient transport. We recommend using the NIOSH Emergency 
Responder Health Monitoring and Surveillance Framework to ensure the safety of 
the crew before, during, and following transport. Finally, the receiving facility 
should update the transport agency with regards to confirmatory patient testing, as 















(‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an EMS-ID Training Curriculum”) 
Education 
 Identification of HID processes 
o Incubation 
o Signs and symptoms 
o Modes of transmission and prevention 
o Available vaccine/prophylaxis 
 Infection prevention and control procedures 
o Hand and glove hygiene concepts 
o PPE selection 
o PPE donning and doffing technique 
o Indication for the use of a portable isolator 
o Principles of isolation and quarantine 
o Cleaning, disinfection, and sterilization of PIU, vehicle, and reusable PPE 
o PPE breach and biohazard spill  
o Liquid and solid waste management 
Vehicle and Special Equipment Preparation 
o Desired PIU 
o Environmental modifications and cabin draping procedures 
o Team communication strategies and devices 
o Pre-positioning the desired patient care equipment 
Patient Management 
o Team configuration and composition 
o Patient preparation and placement 
o En route clinical care guidelines 
o Physical and psychological considerations 
o Transfer of care processes  
Post-Transportation Actions 
o Debriefing 
o Post-mission medical surveillance 
o Continuing education 
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Recommendations for the future 
Given infrastructural and knowledge gaps in the field of EMS transport of 
patients with HIDs, there is an urgent need to establish an evidence-based hands-on 
EMS training curriculum. Our working group agreed that current training practices 
tend to be based on history, tradition, and past responses and not real scientific 
evidence to support a solid best practice. Therefore, future research and pilot 
projects could help us identify the effectiveness of EMS-HID training programs and 
whether there are additional gaps to be covered.  
Based on the workgroup discussions, we recommend having a network of ID 
specialists experienced with portable isolators to review, define, and recommend 
features that can be used by EMS agencies to set standards and protocols. Those ID 
specialists experienced with portable isolators could clearly define whether dry and 
stable patients need to be placed in a PIU and whether there are safer options for 
unstable patients that allow for direct patient contact and interventions, such as 
draping an ambulance and holding the use of portable isolators. Our working group 
highlighted the issue of opening a portable isolator during transport (for emergency 
interventions) and noted that current protocols do not address this issue. Thus, 
future research should tackle the topic of opening a PIU during transport and 
evaluate its impact on patients and crew safety. 
Pediatric transport was another area identified by the workgroup as a gap. 
Future research could help us identify the use of portable isolators when 
transporting infants/children/youth sized HID patients. The CDC guidelines do not 
recommend putting pediatric patients in PPE during EMS transport (2018). Thus, 
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EMS agencies may need additional training on the use of (pediatric isolation 
transport units) and child restraint system (Pedi-Mate). Keeping in mind that these 
types of patients may be accompanied by a caregiver, who will need to be wearing 
the appropriate protective gear and briefed on IPC practices. 
Lastly, EMS agencies should expand their public health role and become 
involved with community health monitoring resources, including participation in 
the collection of patient-related data. EMS leaders and managers should continue to 
recognize issues of interest, including crew safety and disease transmission, to not 
only inform decision-makers but implement the needed training programs 
accordingly. We advocate EMS organizations anticipating the transport of HID 
patients to establish partnerships with receiving hospitals and facilities to identify 
and solve common EMS problematic areas, including patient hand-off, 
decontamination, waste management, and staff surveillance and monitoring.  
Finally, although this project has identified the components of the seven 
content areas for the EMS transport of patients with HIDs, utilizing this project to 
develop an EMS-HID training program is not the last step. EMS agencies should 
work on maintaining IPC competencies among their staff through frequent  
exercises and drills, followed by a systematic training evaluation process, which is 






As to the actual training, we propose the following: 
 
• We recommend that the EMS-HID training program be at least two 
days to allow the adult learner the sufficient time to observe and 
practice the highlighted skills in (‘Table 1: What to Incorporate into an 
EMS-ID Training Curriculum”).  
• Before the start of the actual training, it would be helpful for the 
trainees to receive electronic pre-training learning materials and 
videos that address communication strategies, IPC practices, Level C 
PPE donning and doffing, PIU features, decontamination techniques, 
and waste management.  
• We encourage using a verified checklist to guide students and 
instructors on special equipment preparation, PPE donning and 
doffing, biohazard spill management, and decontamination 
techniques.  
• Developing the following documents can facilitate the delivery of the 
training program and ensure quality throughout the project: 
instructor manual guide, student manual, e-learning materials, 
student and instructor assessments, and the appropriate evaluation 
instruments. 
• Finally, conducting the appropriate pilot testing of the EMS-HID 
training curriculum before delivery can be beneficial in highlighting 
unrecognized gaps within the training.  
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Limitations 
 This project has a few potential limitations. First, no attempt was made to 
identify the credentials of the attendees nor their professional backgrounds. This 
strategy was used to ensure that each member was equally represented and to 
promote open discussion among all participants. The discussion was open to 
achieve an overall objective of sharing knowledge and identifying consensus around 
the seven pre-identified content areas. However, all of our working group 
participants were self-identified as EMS and HID experts, along with CDC and ASPR 
officials and other stakeholders.  
 This projected is also limited by the seven pre-identified Content Areas: 
(learned from past EMS responses to HIDs, including EVD). There may be additional 
EMS-HID problematic areas that were not identified in this project, including the 
transport of pediatric patients with highly hazardous diseases and identifying at-
risk patients through 911 HID-screening questions.  
 Additionally, and as we have mentioned earlier, current EMS-HID training 
practices tend to be based on history and past responses and experiences but not 
real scientific-based evidence to support a solid best practice for training purposes. 
We encourage future research projects to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of an 








 The EMS Workgroup has wrestled with many of the distinctive challenges 
and uncertainties surrounding the transport of patients with highly communicable 
diseases. Areas of uncertainty included: using an ISOPOD versus the EpiShuttle, 
draping the back of the ambulance when using a PIU, placing all medical equipment 
inside the patient cabin, and the respective maximum time limit for providers in 
PPE. These are areas in which future research could provide guidance in order for 
EMS agencies around the U.S. to achieve a higher level of biocontainment. With that 
said, we realize that controversies will always remain. We advocate all EMS agencies 
anticipating the transport of HID patients to have close working relationships with 
receiving hospitals to address common problematic areas and strengthen EMS 
infection control procedures.  
 As we have seen in the recent COVID-19 outbreak, the value of training EMS 
providers, who played a major public health role during the outbreak, on the safe 
transport of patients with HIDs cannot be denied. At the conclusion of this project, 
we attempted to provide perspectives and considerations, from 25 national and 
international organizations, that will benefit prehospital providers caring for and 
anticipating the transport of patients with special pathogens. The results can be 
widely applicable for current and future training programs aiming at developing 
better EMS-HID practices. Future research should focus on developing transport 
recommendations for the HID pediatric population and identify the use of portable 
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